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of the actual holding of that case, and does not necessarily
imply that the felony-murder doctrine should be carried to the
extreme of imposing responsibility where one of the perpetra-
tors is justifiably killed. It is submitted that a judicious bal-
ancing of the factors already mentioned should preclude the
Louisiana courts from following the regrettable extension of the
felony-murder doctrine in Pennsylvania.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - THEFT - MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO
FUTURE FACTS
Defendant agreed to purchase three automobiles from a car
dealer and to pay for them by issuing sight drafts payable two
days from date. At the time he knew his funds in the drawee
bank were insufficient to cover the drafts. Subsequently he sold
the automobiles to third persons without having paid any part
of the purchase price. To a charge of theft defendant pleaded
that the information did not charge a crime, contending that
the drafts were mere promises to pay in the future and hence
were representations as to future events. Defendant was never-
theless convicted. Held, affirmed. Article 67 of the Criminal
Code' which provides in part that any "fraudulent conduct, prac-
tices or representations" constitutes theft, includes fraudulent
representations as to future, as well as to past and existing,
facts. State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955).
At common law the crime of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses is limited to representations of past or existing facts.2
False representations as to future facts, no matter how mis-
leading or dishonest, will not serve as a basis of criminal lia-
bility.3 At first the crime was limited under the common law to
the fraudulent use of false weights and measures. 4 Later it was
1. "Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs
to another, either without the consent of the owner or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently
of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential."
LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
2. Jones v. State, 236 Ala. 30, 182 So. 404 (1938) ; United States v. Pearce,
7 Alaska 246 (1924) ; Willis v. State, 34 Ariz. 363, 271 Pac. 725 (1938) ; Terri-
tory v. Toak, 33 Hawaii 560 (1935) ; People v. Widmayer, 265 Mich. 547, 251
N.W. 540 (1938).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. Rex v. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1124, 97 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B. 1761) ; HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SOCIETY 46 (2d ed. 1952).
NOTES 8071956]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
extended by statute to include verbal pretenses, 5 but was still
burdened with the artificial limitation that the pretense must
relate to a past or present fact.6 Prior to the adoption of the
Criminal Code' the law in Louisiana was in conformity with
this view." The Code, however, changed matters. It was the
acknowledged purpose of the theft article in the Code to com-
bine all the common law stealing offenses into one crime.9 One
effect was to broaden somewhat the coverage of the crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses to include the obtaining
of "anything of value."' 0 This terms was specifically defined
as "including any conceivable thing of the slightest value, mov-
able or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, public or private."'1
The Reporter's comment on the article further indicates that
the phrase, "by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or repre-
sentations," was intended to extend the common law crime of
obtaining by false pretenses to include false representations as
to future, as well as to past or existing, facts. 12
5. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 32. This rule has received general
acceptance in the American jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Tower, 122 Kan. 165,
251 Pac. 401 (1926); Commonwealth v. Althause, 207 Mass. 32, 92 N.E. 202
(1910) ; Watson v. People, 87 N.Y. 561, 41 Am. Rep. 397 (1882).
6. This qualification has been explained as a restriction of criminal liability
to those misrepresentations against which normal prudence cannot defend. 1
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF CROWN 343 (6th ed. 1787) ; HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY
45, 46 (2d ed. 1952).
7. La. Acts 1942, No. 43, p. 137, now LA. R.S. tit. 14 (1950).
8. Pointing up the limitations of the law previous to the Code, the court in one
case noted that "however reprehensive [the defendant's] 'conduct may have been
it does not fall within the scope of the legal definition of false pretenses." State
v. Antoine, 155 La. 120, 122, 98 So. 861, 862 (1924). "The offense denounced by
section 831 of the Revised Statutes [18701 as construed in conformity with the
common law of England, (section 976, Rev. St.) contemplates a false statement
by the accused of a past event, or of an existing fact, and it excludes any repre-
sentations in regard to a future transaction." State v. Colly, 39 La. Ann. 841,
842, 2 So. 496, 497 (1887) ; State v. Ritchie, 172 La. 942, 136 So. 11 (1931)
(dictum).
9. "The most significant change effected throughout the entire Code is found
in the Theft Article which combines all stealing crimes in one .... Under the new
Article 67, all cases where one person takes or misappropriates another's property
will be theft regardless ... of the means employed." Bennett, The Louisiana Crim-
inal Code, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 6, 37-38 (1942); LSA-R.S. 14:67, Re-
porter's Comment, at 357 (1950).
10. At common law liability for obtaining property by false pretenses was
limited to certain classes of "property." In connection with this limitation see
State v. Tower, 122 Kan. 165, 251 Pac. 401 (1926).
11. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950).
12. "The concept as it exists in Anglo-American law includes only false 'pre-
tenses' or 'representations' about present or past facts .... By not including this
latter concept in the definition of 'theft', it is intended to produce identity of mean-
ing between civil and criminal fraud." LSA-R.S. 14:67, Reporter's Comment, at
358.
NOTES
Any doubt as to this extended coverage 3 was removed by
the instant case, in which the court determined for the first
time that criminal liability under the theft article may be based
upon known false representations concerning future events. Ap-
parently the court believed that since it was the crime of false
pretense which had been previously burdened with the juris-
prudential limitation of including only past and existing facts,
the inclusion of the new criteria, "conduct" and "practices," was
meant to include representations as to future facts.14 Although
the Reporter's comment on the theft article was not cited in the
decision, it would further support the court's interpretation.',
The court held in the instant case that the giving of three sight
drafts payable in two days when there was no intent to pay,
but merely an intent to deceive the seller in order to obtain the
property, constituted fraudulent conduct and practices under
the theft article.'6 This interpretation of article 67 would seem
to extend criminal liability to many types of swindles which
had been held, prior to the Code, to have fallen short of the
common law crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. Fol-
lowing the reasoning of this case, for example, it would now
be a criminal act for one to fraudulently promise to pay an-
other's bail in order to obtain money from third persons. 17 Like-
wise, obtaining money by falsely promising to procure a magic
mineral rod capable of detecting oil beneath the surface of the
earth would now seemingly constitute theft.'
Such an extension of the false pretense crime is desirable.
The limitation of the common law appears to have originated
in unplanned historical development rather than in logic.19 It is
interesting to note that the recently adopted Wisconsin Criminal
13. That some confusion existed is evinced by the district court judge's instruc-
tion to the jury upon the trial of the instant case. "A false pretense to be cog-
nizable by our Criminal Statute must apply to the pretense of a present or past
fact. It does not apply to a future promise." Transcript of Record, p. 21, State
v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955).
14. In the instant decision Justice Simon stated that "the theft article was
thus designed to enlarge its scope from that of representations only as a basis
for theft by fraud and to extend the concept so as to include fraudulent conduct
or practice." State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 967, 84 So.2d 601, 603 (1955).
15. These comments have been given consideration by the court in the past.
See State v. Marshfield, 85 So.2d 28, 30 (La. 1956) ; State v. Broadnax, 216 La.
1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950) ; State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945).
16. It might be noted that prosecution in the instant case could have been
brought under the "bad check" statute, LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950), with the same
probable result.
17. See State v. Colly, 39 La. Ann. 841, 2 So. 496 (1887).
18. See State v. Antoine, 155 La. 120, 98 So. 861 (1924).
19. See HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 45-52 (2d ed. 1952).
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Code also eliminates the requirement that a criminally false
statement must relate to present or past facts only.20 Similarly,
the American Law Institute, in the tentative draft of its Model
Penal Code, rejects the common law restriction by defining
"theft by deception" to include deceptions as to future as well
as past and present events.21
Chester A. Eggleston
LABOR LAW - FEDERAL AND STATE RELATIONS - JURISDICTION
TO ENJOIN PEACEFUL PICKETING
After expiration of the contract between plaintiff company
and defendant union representing its truckdrivers, no new agree-
ment was reached and the union went on strike and began peace-
ful picketing. Plaintiff employer petitioned the National Labor
Relations Board to hold representatioin proceedings, alleging
that the defendant union had demanded recognition as the bar-
gaining agent of the company's employees. The Board dismissed
the petition, finding that a question of representation did not
exist because the unit named (one employee) was inappropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining.' Plaintiff then sued
in a Louisiana state court to enjoin the union's peaceful picket-
ing. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in order
to give either party an opportunity to obtain a ruling from the
Board that it would or would not regulate the picketing. Plain-
tiff employer then filed a charge of unfair labor practices with
the Board under section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.2 The Board admitted that it had jurisdiction but
dismissed the charge as being without merit under that section.
The trial court held that the NLRB had exercised jurisdiction
over the matter and, therefore, dismissed plaintiff's applica-
tion for injunction because of lack of jurisdiction. On appeal,
held, affirmed. Jurisdiction of state courts is preempted if the
activity complained of is either protected or prohibited by the
20. " 'False representations' includes a promise made with intent not to per-
form it if it is a part of a false and fraudulent scheme." WIs. CRIm. CODE § 943.20
(1955).
21. A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2, at 63 (Theft by Deception) (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1956).
1. At the time of the strike, only one regularly employed truckdriver worked
for the plaintiff.
2. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (4) (1952).
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